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Abstract
Satellite-based communications, navigation systems and many scientific instruments rely on obser-
vations of trans-ionospheric signals. The quality of these signals can be deteriorated by ionospheric
scintillation which can have detrimental effects on the mentioned applications. Therefore, monitoring
of ionospheric scintillation and quantifying its effect on the ground are of significant interest. In this
work, we develop a methodology which estimates the scintillation induced ionospheric uncertainties in
the sky and translates their impact to the end-users on the ground. First, by using the risk concept
from decision theory and by exploiting the intensity and duration of scintillation events (as measured
by the S4 index), we estimate ionospheric risk maps that could readily give an initial impression on
the effects of scintillation on the satellite-receiver communication. However, to better understand the
influence of scintillation on the positioning accuracy on the ground, we formulate a new weighted dilu-
tion of precision (WPDOP) measure that incorporates the ionospheric scintillation risks as weighting
factors for the given satellite-receiver constellations. These weights depend implicitly on scintillation
intensity and duration thresholds which can be specified by the end-user based on the sensitivity of
the application, for example. We demonstrate our methodology by using scintillation data from South
America, and produce ionospheric risk maps which illustrate broad scintillation activity, especially at
the equatorial anomaly. Moreover, we construct ground maps of WPDOP over a grid of hypothetical
receivers which reveal that ionospheric scintillation can also affect such regions of the continent that
are not exactly under the observed ionospheric scintillation structures. Particularly, this is evident in
cases when only the Global Positioning System (GPS) is available.
1. Introduction
Many industrial and scientific applications exploit Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS),
that includes Global Positioning System (GPS), Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema,
(GLONASS) and Galileo (European navigation system), for precision positioning, agriculture, trans-
portation, surveying, construction and geodesy among others. Satellite links using frequencies up to
few GHz (VHF through L-band) can experience significant signal amplitude and phase fluctuations
due to small-scale plasma density inhomogeneities, a phenomenon known as scintillation [12, 1]. The
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amplitude scintillation (i.e. temporal fluctuation of the signal strength) and phase scintillation oc-
cur often at lower latitudes and can cause periods of reduced signal power at the receiver’s antenna
(fading). Therefore, GNSS signal-to-noise-ratio may drop below the receiver-tracking threshold [20]
thereby leading to loss of positioning information, that can persist for a significant period of time [6].
Many characteristics of scintillation are well-studied [1, 7, 11, 28, 8, 20, 17, 44]. It has been
shown that scintillation activity varies with operating frequency, local time, season, geomagnetic
activity level(planetary K-index, Kp), and the 11-year solar cycle [46, 29, 38, 7, 28, 20]. Moreover,
the scintillation effects vary according to the user’s location (i.e. geomagnetic latitude). During high
scintillation activity, these effects can be a serious problem for GNSS users in certain regions, such
as polar and equatorial latitudes, while users in other regions (e.g. middle latitudes) are not affected
to a large extent [48, 2, 20, 31]. Equatorial regions experience strong scintillation mostly after sunset
until a few hours after midnight local time [39, 20, 21]. In equatorial ionosphere, the most significant
scintillation activity occurs with deep signal fades causing a GNSS receiver to lose lock and degrade
positioning accuracy [47, 6, 36, 33].
Limited case studies have been carried out related to the effects of scintillation for the end-user
[60, 36, 49, 58, 41, 3, 31, 15, 18] and often global climatological models fail to describe extreme day-to-
day variability of scintillation [57]. Moreover, because scintillation is frequency dependent and cannot
be eliminated, for example by combining observable signals at different frequencies [32, 54], the con-
stant monitoring of scintillation activity using in-situ measurements alongside with the development of
mathematical methodologies, which describe, quantify and interpret its impact on GNSS communica-
tions, is substantial to mitigate its effect. In this framework, we develop a mathematical methodology
to estimate ionospheric scintillation risks based on scintillation measurements and decision theory.
These risks are given by the joint probability of scintillation intensity and duration estimated using
information obtained from ground based scintillation monitors. Thus, in contrast to the commonly
estimated statistics (e.g. averages or percentages of scintillation measurements above a threshold as in
[48, 28, 49, 19]), we use data collected from a network of scintillation monitors to construct ionospheric
risk maps that describe and monitor scintillation behavior. While the ionospheric maps can readily be
used to get an (initial) impression of the effects of scintillation on a satellite-receiver communication,
in this work, we propose to incorporate the scintillation risk into the receiver’s position dilution of
precision (PDOP) [27].
Standard PDOP is a well-known way to quantify the reliability and integrity of a GNSS positioning
system by using the geometry of the available satellite constellations [45, 59, 9, 50, 52]. Here, we show
how the degradation of PDOP occurs relative to the location of ionization structures in the F-region
due to scintillation. To do that, we propose to use a weighted position dilution of precision (WP-
DOP) which is estimated by assigning different weights to receiver-satellite links using the ionospheric
scintillation risks along the corresponding line-of-sights. Hence, in addition to the number and the
geometry of the visible satellites, we take into account the effect of scintillation. Previous works have
employed empirical error tracking models, e.g. Conker model [11], to implicitly introduce underly-
ing scintillation activity by weighting receiver’s measurements with the inverse of the variance of the
tracking error. However, these approaches are often susceptible to model limitations and requirements
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of heuristically selected parameters and their applicability is limited due to the requirement of specific
software/hardware that is available mainly in operating ground stations and not in standard GNSS
receivers [5, 13]. Instead, our approach utilizes weighing factors based on risks associated directly
with monitored scintillation data. With the help of these weights, we are able to construct maps that
describe the expected uncertainty in positioning results during ionospheric scintillation. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time such a methodology is introduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical background
and mathematical expression of the risks and the proposed WPDOP. In section 3, we describe the
formulae and technical details for the implementation of the proposed ionospheric risks and the cor-
responding ground WPDOP values. In section 4, we demonstrate our methodology by estimating
ionospheric risk maps over South America using real scintillation data. Subsequently, we construct
ground maps based on two different set-ups using either only GPS or GPS, GLONASS and Galileo.
Then, we discuss the main observations and further potentials of the proposed methodology. Finally,
in section 5, we present a summary of our work and future aims.
2. Methodology
2.1. Risk concept
While it may be straightforward to extract statistics (e.g. averages or standard deviations) to
describe scintillation [30], nevertheless it is important to interpret those statistics for an end-user, in
terms of the costs expected for a particular application when scintillation is experienced. For this
purpose, we use risk analysis from decision theory [37]. Risk can be defined as the expected loss
incurred when an activity is performed (for example satellite-receiver communication). To estimate
the risk we need i) to find features that describe the condition in which we perform this activity (e.g.
communication under scintillation can be described through the measured S4 value), ii) the frequency
of occurrence of these features and iii) how injurious the condition described by these features is to
the successful outcome of the activity. These are respectively expressed by i) a feature vector ii) a
probability and iii) a loss function.
In this section, we describe the background theory and definitions about loss function and risk
before making it application-specific in the next section. Here, we denote random variables by capital
letters and their realizations by lowercase letters. We start with the measurable feature Z ∈ Z , where
Z represents the set of all possible feature vectors (e.g. scintillation index, etc).
Let us introduce a 0-1 loss function
`(z; zth) =
0 if z < zth1 otherwise, (1)
which implies there is no loss when values of z are less than a specified threshold, but otherwise losses
are equally injurious. Although this is a simple loss function, it nevertheless is instructive for this
particular problem without increasing computational complexity, and as will be shown it permits a
straightforward interpretation.
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The risk is then defined as the expected value of the loss function given by
r(zth) = E[`(z; zth)] =
∫
Z
`(z; zth) p(z) dz, (2)
where E[.] denotes the expectation value and p(z) is the probability density funciton of the measurable
feature Z. From (eq. 1) and (eq. 2), we have that
r(zth) = pi(Z ≥ zth), (3)
where pi(.) denotes probability. Thus, the risk has a simple interpretation in terms of probability.
2.2. Risk associated with ionospheric scintillation
In this section, we apply the previous analysis to estimate risk maps using scintillation features.
Let X denote a scintillation index (e.g. S4 value). Moreover, we define as a scintillation event a time
series of scintillation index values above a scintillation threshold denoted by xth over a duration limit
dth (see Fig. 1). The duration of scintillation events can be treated as a random variable denoted by
D. Based on the analysis of section 2.1, we have that (X,D) ≡ Z.
Using the insight that the vulnerability of a link depends on the value of the scintillation index (e.g.
strong scintillation when S4 > 0.6) and duration of a scintillation event, we define the loss function
`(x, d;xth, dth) =
0 if x < xth and d < dth1 otherwise, (4)
where xth and dth are the intensity and duration thresholds respectively. These thresholds can be
chosen to reflect the specifications of the receiver and the needs of safety critical applications.
From (eq. 3), the risk due to scintillation features is
rion(xth, dth) = pi(X ≥ xth, D ≥ dth). (5)
Hence, the risk of the underlying activity, depends on the joint probability of the duration and intensity
of scintillation events and takes values between 0 and 1.
2.3. Effect of scintillation on the positioning accuracy
The proposed risk can readily be used to give an initial impression of the effect of scintillation
in a satellite-receiver communication. However, to better understand the influence of scintillation on
the positioning accuracy on the ground, a well-known quantity as the dilution of precision can be
estimated [27].
Towards this aim, this section introduces a weighted position dilution of precision (WPDOP) as
a measure of uncertainty in estimating the receiver’s position. To put our analysis in perspective,
we first discuss the theoretical basis of the standard position dilution of precision (PDOP) from the
Bayesian point of view. Then, we explain how in addition to the availability and geometry of the
satellites, the proposed WPDOP can include information about the effect of ionospheric scintillation.
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2.3.1. Standard position dilution of precision
Following similar analysis as in [27], for a ground receiver at location r = (rx, ry, rz)
T, the po-
sitioning error at time t, denoted by ∆r = (∆rx,∆ry,∆rz)
T, can be expressed through the linear
system
b = A∆r + ε, (6)
where b ∈ RS is a vector with the differences between the measured and modelled pseudorange values,
A = [n1, . . . ,nS ]
T ∈ RS×3 where ns is a unit column vector pointing from the modelled (approximated)
receiver position to the satellite and S is the total number of visible satellites at a time instance t.
Error ε ∈ RS represents the measurement noise plus model errors and ionospheric effects (including
scintillation). Further details about the derivation of the aforementioned linear system are given in
Appendix Appendix A 1.
In the PDOP standard probabilistic analysis [27, 35], the noise ε is modelled as i.i.d. Gaussian
given by ε ∼ N (0, γIS×S) (with constant error variance γ > 0 and IS×S identity matrix). A point
estimate for the positioning error ∆r can be obtained by solving
∆̂r := arg max
∆r
p(∆r|b), (7)
where p(∆r|b) is the posterior distribution of ∆r given by p(∆r|b) ∝ p(b|∆r) pi(∆r) based on the
Bayes theorem, where p(b|∆r) ∝ exp {− 12γ (A∆r − b)T(A∆r − b)} is the likelihood and p(∆r) is the
prior distribution [23].
With an uninformative prior p(∆r), the positioning error can be obtained by ∆̂r := arg max∆r p(b|∆r)
which is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate. The ML estimate is
∆̂r = (ATA)−1ATb, (8)
and it is equal to the least squares solution of system (eq. 6). The solution (eq. 8) exists as long as
there are 3 or more satellites located in distinct directions in the sky. Quantitatively, the rank of (ATA)
can be used as an indicator whether the problem is well posed or not. For example, if rank(ATA) ≥ 3,
then we can deduce that there are enough satellites for the position estimation. However, the accuracy
of the solution (eq. 8) depends on the inverse matrix (ATA)−1 (whether it is well or ill-conditioned).
From the Bayesian point of view, this inverse matrix multiplied by error variance γ is the posterior
covariance of p(∆r|b) given by Γ = γ(ATA)−1 and its diagonal elements (posterior variances) can help
to quantify the expected accuracy of the estimate ∆̂r [23]. Large posterior variances may indicate that
there is possibly an overlapping between satellites (eclipse phenomenon), collinearity or inappropriate
geometric constellation. The square root of the trace of the posterior Γ normalized by the constant
variance γ is the well-known position dilution of precision (PDOP)[27]. In particular, for a ground
1 We note here that the clock offset is omitted (as a variable to be estimated) from the current formulation. Matrix
A, ∆r, b and ε are time-varying variables but for simplicity in the notation, time t has not been used in this context.
Also, linear system (eq. 6) helps us to introduce the different dilution of precision formulae. The estimation of vector b
is out of the scope of the current work, the interested reader is referred to for example [53].
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receiver at location r and time t, the PDOP is given by
PDOPr,t =
√
tr(Γ)
γ
=
√
tr ((ATA)−1), (9)
where tr() denotes the trace of matrix given by tr
(
(ATA)−1
)
=
∑S
s=1 diag
(
(ATA)−1
)
. Hence, PDOP
can be used to quantify the expected uncertainty in the estimate (eq. 8).
2.3.2. Weighted position dilution of precision
Now, by considering the scintillation effect independently from all the other errors, the noise term
in the observation model (eq. 6) can be decomposed into two uncorrelated errors
ε = εsc + εrem ∈ RS . (10)
The error due to ionospheric scintillation can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution given by
εsc ∼ N (0,Γεsc) [35] where its covariance is a diagonal matrix Γεsc = diag(γ(s)sc ) with the variances
depending on the scintillation risks along the available satellite-receiver ray-paths . Therefore, the
error variances due to scintillation can be expressed as a function of the ionospheric risk r
(s)
ion along
each ray-path s, i.e.
γ(s)sc = h(r
(s)
ion) for s = 1, . . . , S. (11)
Function h(r
(s)
ion), since is the variance of the measurement errors caused by scintillation in link s, should
be a positive monotonically non decreasing function, and satisfy h(r
(s)
ion)→∞ for risk r(s)ion → 1 (more
uncertainty is introduced in the estimates due to scintillation) and h(r
(s)
ion) → 0 when risk r(s)ion → 0
(minimal effects due to scintillation in the estimates when risk is low).
The remaining error εrem, that encloses all the other modelling and measurement related uncer-
tainties, is modelled as Gaussian, i.e. εrem ∼ N (0, γIS×S) with γ constant as in the standard PDOP
analysis2 [27]. We notice that in the current analysis the errors between different links are considered
uncorrelated which is a plausible assumption since there are usually large distances between different
ray-paths 3.
Then, the covariance matrix of total error ε given by Γε = γI
S×S + Γεsc is a diagonal matrix
Γε = diag(γε(s)) with elements
γε(s) = γ + h(r
(s)
ion) for s = 1, . . . , S. (12)
The positioning error estimate is now
∆̂r = (ATΓ−1ε A)
−1ATΓ−1ε b, (13)
2Gaussian distribution with constant variance is a standard modelling assumption when prior statistical information
about the observation error is limited or unavailable [35].
3For GPS L1 frequency, the most effective spatial size of the electron density irregularities that causes amplitude
scintillation is of order 400 m (first Fresnel scale at ∼ 350 km altitude) [43, 25, 40]. The IPPs of two different ray-paths
are separated by distances that are much larger than the size of a single scintillation structure. Therefore, it is very
unlikely for two ray-paths to cross the same ionospheric structure.
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when S ≥ 3 and rank(ATΓ−1ε A) ≥ 3. The posterior covariance of ∆r is
Γ = (ATΓ−1ε A)
−1 (14)
and the weighted position dilution of precision (WPDOP) for a ground receiver at location r and time
t is defined (in a similar way as in eq. 9) as the square root of the trace of the posterior Γ normalized
by the constant γ and it is given by
WPDOPr,t =
√
tr(Γ)
γ
=
√√√√tr(AT(Γε
γ
)−1
A
)−1
=
√
(tr(ATWA)−1), (15)
where tr
(
(ATWA)−1
)
=
∑S
s=1 diag
(
(ATWA)−1
)
and W =
(
Γε
γ
)−1
is a diagonal matrix, with ele-
ments
ws =
γ
γε(s)
=
γ
γ + h(r
(s)
ion)
for s = 1 : S, (16)
where 0 ≤ ws ≤ 1 and γ constant. A rigorous derivation of (eq. 15) is given in appendix Appendix B.
Based on equation (eq. 16) we have that ws = 1 when r
(s)
ion = 0 (no scintillation, since h(r
(s)
ion) = 0 ),
and ws = 0 when r
(s)
ion → 1 (if h(r(s)ion)→∞). The shape of h() in (eq. 16) may be selected based on prior
knowledge or application requirements. In general, the proposed WPDOP uses both information about
the number of available satellites, their geometry in the sky and the risks associated with scintillation
along the visible ray-paths. If rank(ATWA) < 3 i.e. the number of available satellites is less than 3
then WPDOPr,t is undefined.
3. Methodology
3.1. Single shell ionospheric model
The F-region (especially around 350 km of altitude) is of main concern for GNSS users due to
propagation errors caused by the dynamics of the large electron density. To construct surface iono-
spheric maps it is standard to consider the ionospheric thin shell approximation at 350 km altitude,
based on the assumption that the entirety of the electron content (which affects a link) is acting at
the point where a ray-path of a satellite-receiver intersects (or pierces) the ionospheric shell at that
altitude [14]. Hence, an ionospheric risk map can be estimated using ground measurements that are
directly projected on the ionospheric shell at the corresponding ionospheric pierce points (IPPs) 4
(similarly as in [55]). The projected (scintillation) measurements at the 350km ionospheric shell will
be referred to as IPP data in the following text.
3.2. Ionospheric computational domain and data accumulation
For the construction of an ionospheric risk map, the thin ionospheric shell was discretized using a
uniform grid where each pixel got its own risk value. In the results section, we estimated scintillation
4IPP is referred to as the point where a line-of-sight from the ground receiver to a satellite “punctures” the ionosphere
at the ionospheric shell.
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risk maps over South America and as a reliable index of scintillation at low-latitudes, we used S4
data which is the ratio of the standard deviation of the received signal intensity (measured by a 50
Hz sampling rate) to the averaged intensity during an 1 minute time interval. A risk was estimated
at each ionospheric pixel v based on the joint probability (eq. 5) using IPP data accumulated over a
time interval τ . We note that there is an implicit assumption of statistical stationarity i.e. the joint
probability does not change over time.
3.3. A scintillation event
A scintillation event was introduced briefly in section 2. Here, we explain more analytically the
properties of such events. Particularly, duration of a scintillation event is the time interval where the
scintillation values for a specific (satellite-scintillation monitor) link are greater than a given threshold.
In the schematic example of Figure 1, we show how different scintillation events are determined using
sequences of IPP data samples (depicted by small circles) for 3 different links imagined that their
ray-paths are passing through the same ionospheric pixel v. The horizontal dashed line indicates a
selected intensity threshold xth. All the links experience scintillation events since there are data points
above the threshold. For link 1 (in blue), we can observe that there are two distinctive scintillation
events between [t2− t6] and [t11− t14]. However, for links 2 (in yellow) and 3 (in black) we have to deal
with data gaps related either to strong scintillation or other reasons. In these cases, we have to decide
whether the available data and the corresponding gaps are considered as a single scintillation event or
not. In the current implementation, we consider that there is a single scintillation event if the gap is
small (i.e. less than 4 minutes). For a longer gap, we consider that two separate scintillation events of
shorter durations take place. Extra conditions based on the values of the scintillation samples before
Time
S
c
in
ti
lla
ti
o
n
 I
n
d
e
x
Threshold
t1 t2 t3 t4 t7t6t5 t11 t14
gap 4 min
event for link1 event for link1
gap 5 min
Sat-Rec Link 3
Sat-Rec Link 2
Sat-Rec Link 1
Figure 1: A schematic example which show how a scintillation event is determined. This figure shows IPP data samples
(depicted with circles) in one ionospheric pixel over a short interval of time (the sampling period is considered 1 minute).
Each colour corresponds to a data sequence from a different satellite-ground station link. IPP values greater than the
intensity threshold (depicted by the horizontal dashed line) indicate that the sample belongs to a scintillation event. For
link 1, we can observe that there are two distinct scintillation events between [t2 − t6] and [t11 − t14]. Links 2 and 3
have data gaps of duration 4 and 5 minutes, respectively. If the gap threshold is 4 minutes then we can consider a single
scintillation event for link 2 and two scintillation events of short durations for Link 3.
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and after the gap may also be applied to differentiate single or multiple events. For example very high
values of the S4 samples on either side of a large gap (e.g. S4 ≥ 0.6) can imply a single event rather
than two distinct events.
3.4. Risk estimation
In this section we describe the mathematical formulae for the estimation of the ionospheric risk
maps. As we mentioned earlier, risk maps are constructed by estimating pixel-wise the joint probability
(eq. 5) using the accumulated IPP data at each pixel of the discretized ionospheric domain over a
period of time τ . Based on that and (eq. 5) we can mathematically express a risk in a pixel as the
conditional probability given pixel v and time window τ , i.e.
rv,τion(xth, dth) = pi(X ≥ xth, D ≥ dth|v, τ). (17)
Moreover, we introduce the following notation for clarity. A scintillation measurement is given by
xs(v(t)), where v(t) = (vx(t), vy(t)) is the geographic location (at the ionospheric pierce point) at time
t. Super-script s is used to identify that the measured index corresponds to a particular satellite-
monitor link. Then, a scintillation event is a time series of scintillation samples xs(v(t)) ≥ xth for an
interval [t, t+ ∆d], where d ≥ dth, when these samples belong to a single pixel, v (i.e. v(t) ∈ v). Here,
∆ is the sampling period and dth is an integer denoting the minimum number of samples required to
qualify for the event (a.k.a. duration threshold). Thus, each IPP sample can be represented pairwise
as (xs(v(t)), ds(t)) that includes the scintillation value and the number of samples in the scintillation
event to which xs(v(t)) belongs. For example, ds(t) = 0 when xs(v(t)) < xth which means that sample
xs(v(t)) does not belong to a scintillation event. On the other hand when xs(v(t)) ≥ xth then sample
xs(v(t)) belongs to a scintillation event and then ds(t) equals the number of consecutive samples
(before and after(and including) xs(v(t)) at time t) that exceed threshold xth.
In the following analysis, for simplicity in the probability expressions, we write measurement
xs(v(t))|t=tj = xs[j], where xs[j] is the value of the scintillation index at time tj for satellite-receiver
link s and the corresponding IPP (ionospheric location) of xs[j] is denoted by vs[j].
The joint probability of X and D (eq. 17) can be re-written as
pi(X ≥ xth, D ≥ dth|v, τ) = pi(D ≥ dth|X ≥ xth, v, τ)pi(X ≥ xth|v, τ). (18)
The previous equation can be further expanded, i.e.
pi(X ≥ xth, D ≥ dth|v, τ) =
∑
dk≥dth
pi(D = dk|X ≥ xth, v, τ) pi(X ≥ xth|v, τ), (19)
where dk is an integer denoting the number of samples (x
s[j], . . . , xs[j + dk]) ≥ xth, xs[j − 1] < xth
and xs[j + dk + 1] < xth, which corresponds to a temporal duration of dk ∆.
Based on equation (eq. 19), risk (eq. 17) is estimated by first calculating probability pi(X ≥ xth|v, τ)
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according to
pi(X ≥ xth|v, τ) =
∑S
s=1
∑Ns−1
j=0 U(x
s[j]|v, τ, xth)∑S
s=1
∑Ns−1
j=0 U(x
s[j]|v, τ, 0) , (20)
where U is a step function defined as
U(xs[j]|v, τ, α) =
1 if xs[j] ≥ α given that vs[j] ∈ v and tj ∈ τ0 otherwise, (21)
index S is the total number of available links, α is the intensity threshold and Ns the number of the
available scintillation samples (i.e. total number of measurements) for link s over a time window τ .
Furthermore, the conditional probability pi(D = dk|X ≥ xth, v, τ) is
pi(D = dk|X ≥ xth, v, τ) =
∑S
s=1
∑Ns−1
j=0 Hd (x
s[j], . . . , xs[j + dk]|v, τ, xth) dk∑S
s=1
∑Ns−1
j=0 U (x
s[j]|v, τ, xth))
, (22)
where function Hd is defined as
Hd(x
s[j], . . . , xs[j + dk]|v, τ, xth) =

1 if (xs[j], . . . , xs[j + dk]) ≥ xth, xs[j + dk + 1] < xth and xs[j − 1] < xth
when {vs[j − 1], . . . , vs[j + dk + 1]} ∈ v
1 if (xs[j], . . . , xs[j + dk]) ≥ xth and xs[j − 1] < xth
when {vs[j − 1], . . . , vs[j + dk]} ∈ v and vs[j + dk + 1] 6∈ v
1 if (xs[j], . . . , xs[j + dk]) ≥ xth and xs[j + dk + 1] < xth
when {vs[j], . . . , vs[j + dk + 1]} ∈ v and vs[j − 1] 6∈ v
1 if (xs[j], . . . , xs[j + dk]) ≥ xth
when {vs[j], . . . , vs[j + dk]} ∈ v and vs[j − 1], vs[j + dk + 1] 6∈ v
0 otherwise
(23)
and gives either 1 or 0 based on the sequence xs[j − 1], . . . , xs[j + dk + 1].
Finally by estimating pixel by pixel a risk (eq. 17) at each v, we can obtain a map in matrix form
denoted by
Rτion ∈ RV1×V2 , where [V1 × V2] is the dimension of a uniform grid. (24)
3.5. WPDOP using scintillation risks
To estimate WPDOP (eq. 15) first we compute matrix A ∈ RS×3 which includes the relative posi-
tions between a ground receiver and S available satellites following the details of appendix Appendix
A.
Regarding the weights, without further knowledge about the precise shape of function h() (the
properties of which we anticipate may be gleaned from either statistical or physical information, or
alternatively selected based on the requirements of a specific application), we approximate ws (eq. 16)
by
ws := (1− r(s)ion)k, (25)
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where r
(s)
ion is the ionospheric risk value at the intersection point between the line-of-sight of (link) s
and the ionospheric risk map at 350km. Weight (eq. 25) satisfies the limiting values for ws (eq. 16) as
risk varies and parameter k ≥ 0 penalizes our trust to a ray-path based on the scintillation risk value.
For the estimation of WPDOP in the result section, we set k = 2 to ensure that relatively high trust
is given to ray-paths that are associated with low scintillation risks.
So, given a hypothetical ground receiver and S available satellites, different weights are assigned
to the ray-paths (between the receiver and the satellites) based on the points the ray-paths pierce the
ionospheric map. Then, WPDOP (eq. 15) is estimated using the weighting matrix
W =

(1− r(1)ion)k . . . 0
...
. . .
0 (1− r(S)ion )k
 . (26)
Figure 3.b explains schematically how to assigns a weight to each each ray-path using the ionospheric
risk map.
4. Data, map construction, results and discussion
In this section, we present ionospheric risk maps and corresponding WPDOP ground maps over the
area of South America at geographic latitude between ∼ −40◦N and ∼ 10◦N and longitude between
∼ −90◦E and ∼ −35◦E. This region experiences significant scintillation activity that causes deep
signal fades inducing a GNSS receiver to lose lock of one or more satellite signals and includes the
equatorial anomaly [4].
4.1. S4 data
Scintillation activity maximizes mostly after sunset until a few hours after midnight local time
during the equinoctial months in the equatorial ionosphere [16]. For this reason in this study we used
available S4 data between 23.00 and 03.00 Universal Time (UT). The S4 data (that was used to
produce a risk map) was measured from a network of 38 ISMR scintillation monitors using all the
available GPS, GLONNASS and Galileo satellites over the 4 hour period. In particular, the S4
measurements ( with sampling period ∆ = 1 minute) and their corresponding IPPs at 350km were
provided from the CIGALA/CALIBRA network - UNESP web server [10]. The IPPs values for the
interval between 23.00 and 03.00 (UT) are depicted with black dots Figure 2.a. The period under
investigation, which was during the night-time of 02 and 03 November 2014, was characterized by
mild to strong scintillation according to the information provided by the web software (ISMR Query
Tool) (http:// is-cigala-calibra.fct.unesp.br) [55].
4.2. Construction of ionospheric maps
For the ionospheric risk maps, a uniform standard grid of spatial resolution 2◦ × 2◦ was used for
the estimation of the risk in each ionospheric pixel (as suggested also by [51]). A scintillation risk
(joint probability eq. 17) was estimated in each pixel using accumulated S4 data over the interval
23.00-03.00 (UT) (for example Figure 2.b shows the available data over the 4 hours interval for a set
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of nine pixels). Ionospheric pixels that did not have any IPP data were left blank in the following
ionospheric maps.
For clarity in the subsequent text, the night time interval (23.00-03.00 UT) crossing from 02 to 03
November 2014 will be simply referenced as that of 02 November 2014, and similarly the night time
from 03 to 04 November 2014 will be referenced as that of 03 November 2014.
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(a)                                                           (b)
Figure 2: (a) The ionospheric thin shell at 350 km was subdivided into a grid of spacial resolution 2◦ × 2◦. The traces
of all the projected S4 samples (IPP data) on the ionospheric grid at 350km over a period of 4 hours (02 November
2014) are depicted with black dots. The locations of scintillation monitors are denoted by blue triangles. (b) This figure
depicts in higher resolution the square area marked with light blue color in Figure 2.a. The traces of the projected S4
samples that correspond to the same (satellite-scintillation monitor) link are marked with the same color.
4.3. Construction of ground maps
The spatial resolution of the ground maps was selected as 1◦ × 1◦ (in latitude and longitude)
by placing hypothetical receivers (denoted by green triangles) in the centre of each pixel as shown
in Figure 3.c. To calculate the WPDOP and PDOP for a set of hypothetical ground receivers, the
positions of the satellites in view have to be estimated. There are different ways that this can be
done using for example orbital information. In our study, the locations of the available satellites were
computed geometrically at time t using downloaded data from [10]. Particularly, the downloaded
data provided, in addition to S4 measurements, the IPP geographic coordinates at 350km (between
the scintillation monitor and the satellite), the time of data acquisition and the satellite-monitor
information (i.e. the PRN code of the satellite and name/location of the scintillation monitor) for each
acquired S4 measurement. Thus, the IPPs and locations of scintillation monitors that are associated
with the same satellite at time t were used to form 3D lines. The extensions of these lines were
intersected at the location of the satellite (as depicted in Figure 3.a).
Furthermore, given the positions of the satellites at time t over South America, the satellites
in view for a hypothetical ground receiver were determined based on an elevation angle cut-off of
20◦. Then, matrix A in (eq. 15) was calculated using the locations of the satellites in view and the
hypothetical receiver. For each (satellite-hypothetical receiver) line-of-sight (LoS), each weight (eq. 25)
in the diagonal matrix W was computed using the risk value at the pixel where the line pierced the
ionospheric map at 350km. Figure 3.b illustrates an example of the estimation of the WPDOP for a
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Figure 3: (a) We localize a single satellite by estimating the intersection of line-of-sights (LoS) that are formed by the
ionospheric pierce points (IPPs) of S4 samples and the locations of the scintillation monitors (denoted by blue triangles)
at which the S4 samples were recorded. (b) Schematic explanation of the estimation of the WPDOP for a hypothetical
ground receiver. In this example we have five available satellites which intersect the risk map at 350 km within five
pixels marked with small black dots. The weighting matrix in this example has the form W = diag
(
(1− r(i)ion)2
)
where
r
(s)
ion are the risk values at the intersection points between the ray-paths s and the risk map at 350 km (for s = 1, . . . , 5).
Then, matrix W is inserted in the (eq.15). (c) Green triangles show the locations of hypothetical receivers on the ground
(used to estimate the dilution of precision ground maps)
hypothetical ground receiver when the ionospheric risk map is taken into account and five satellites
are in view.
4.4. Ionospheric risk maps over South America
Figure 4 and 5 show the ionospheric risk maps based on the joint probability of scintillation
intensity and duration, using different thresholds for the S4 value and duration of the scintillation
event. More precisely, in Figures 4 and 5 the rows correspond to S4 thresholds 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7
respectively, and the columns correspond to duration thresholds of 1, 5, 10 minutes respectively. The
green line designates the geomagnetic equator and the white pixels correspond to ionospheric regions
where the risk was not estimated due to lack of data (the ionospheric regions where IPP data was
available appears in the left image of Figure 2 for 02 November 2014). As expected, based on the
results of Figure 4 we can observe that as the thresholds values are getting higher the risk decreases.
Moreover, we can see that there are two bands of scintillation i.e. north and south of the geomag-
netic equator. This corresponds to the well known equatorial anomaly [24]. The risk of scintillation
in the north band seems to disappear for increasing thresholds relatively drastically (see second and
third row in Figure 4) which indicates that scintillation of shorter duration and lower intensity pre-
vails in this ionospheric region. We note that this could also be related to the number of the ground
scintillation monitors which are less in the north band compared to the south band (so the south band
may give us more reliable estimates).
In Figure 5 scintillation structures remain similar as in Figure 4, however, we can notice that the
scintillation in Figure 4 covers a broader area of the south band compared to Figure 5 where high
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scintillation activity is observed predominantly over Brazil. Overall, we can say that scintillation of
low intensity (0.3 ≤ S4 < 0.5) affects a broad area of South America with risks approaching 0.8
whereas scintillation risk drops drastically for S4 ≥ 0.7 during both days.
Figure 4: Ionospheric risk maps for different S4 thresholds and durations for 02 November 2014 (rows correspond to S4
threshold 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, and columns correspond to duration thresholds of 1, 5, 10 minutes). The risk maps (based
on the joint probability eq. 17) were estimated using accumulated S4 over the interval 23.00-03.00 (UT). The dash green
line depicts the geomagnetic equator.
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Figure 5: Ionospheric risk maps for different S4 thresholds and durations for 03 November 2014 (rows correspond to S4
thresholds 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, and columns correspond to duration thresholds of 1, 5, 10 minutes). The risk maps (based
on the joint probability eq. 17) were estimated using accumulated S4 over the interval 23.00-03.00 (UT)
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4.5. Ground maps over South America
We illustrate the effect of scintillation on the ground by estimating the proposed weighted dilution
of precision in a set of hypothetical ground receivers (small green triangles in Figure 3.c) using the risk
maps estimated in the previous section and different sets of satellite constellations. Two representative
examples of instant ground maps are given in Figure 6 and 7 for 02 November 2014 and 03 November
2014 respectively. For each day, the WPDOP and PDOP ground maps were calculated by utilizing
the geometry of satellite constellations at precisely 01.00.09 (UT). The weights for the WPDOP maps
were based on the ionospheric risks maps estimated in subsection 4.4 using S4 data collected over
23.00-03.00 (UT). In particular, a weight (eq. 25) for a link was computed using the risk value at the
point where a receiver-satellite ray-path pierces the ionospheric risk map (at 350 km). The risk maps
(a) and (e) were calculated considering duration threshold of 5 minutes and S4 intensity threshold
either 0.3 or 0.5 (as shown in Figure 6 and 7). Two sets of ground map estimations were computed
to show the effects of scintillation with respect to the number of available constellations: (i) GPS (7
satellites) and (ii) GPS, GLONASS and Galileo (17 satellites). The elevation angle cut-off was set to
20◦, i.e. ray-paths which were lower than this threshold were discarded from the PDOP and WPODP
calculations.
In Figure 6 (and similarly in Figure 7), along column 1 we can observe the ionospheric risk maps;
along column 2 the maps of WPDOP estimated based on the risk maps (of column 1); along column
3 the map of PDOP (we note that maps (c) and (g) are identical and have been repeated to ease the
comparisons); and along column 4 the contribution of scintillation to the total dilution of precision (in
a percentage form). In Figure 6.i, PDOP values in the ground map (c) and (g) are low and increase
slightly towards the west coast; in particular in the area marked with the red ellipse the PDOP values
are higher than in the corresponding area in Figure 6.ii (map (c) and (g)) due to less satellite coverage.
In general, WPDOP values (maps (b) and (f) along column 2) in Figure 6.i are increased mainly in
the region under the scintillation structures. However, for longitude between ∼ −50◦E and ∼ −40◦E
and latitude between ∼ −20◦N and ∼ −15◦N, (i.e. the area marked with a pink ellipse in maps (b)
and (f)) the WPDOP values are relatively low even though the risk due to scintillation over that
region is significant. This is most likely because the ray-paths of the satellites in view (that were
used to estimate the WPDOP at 01.00.09 (UT)) do not intersect the scintillation active region at this
particular moment. Moreover, in the Northwest of the continent (area marked with blue circles in
maps (b) and (f) of Figure 6.i), we can observe high WPDOP values. The higher values of WPDOP
in that area (compared to the PDOP values in map (c) of Figure 6.i in the same area) indicate that
ws  1. Low weights mean that the ray-paths between the hypothetical receivers located in the
Northwest and the satellites in view at 01.00.09 (UT) pierce the ionospheric map in pixels with high
risk values based on (eq. 25).
WPDOP ground map (f) in Figure 6.i (column 2 and second row) reveals that high S4 threshold
(i.e S4 ≥ 0.5) reduces the effect of scintillation on the WPDOP values. This is because the strong
scintillation activity is more focal based on the corresponding risk map (e) in Figure 6.i. However, by
comparing the percentage maps (d) and (h) along the column 4 of Figure 6.i, we can observe that the
loss in dilution of precision is localized similarly both when S4 ≥ 0.3 and S4 ≥ 0.5. Both (WPDOP-
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PDOP)/WPDOP maps of column 4 (in Figure 6.i) give a percentage of at least 30% contribution from
scintillation which can be observed for longitude between∼ −60◦E and∼ −75◦E and latitude∼ −20◦N
and ∼ −25◦N (area marked with yellow ellipses in map (d) and (h)). This suggests that scintillation
has a significant influence in the position accuracy and has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we
can notice that further away from the ionospheric scintillation structures, the scintillation contribution
to WPDOP drops to zero.
With the introduction of extra constellations, the effect of scintillation is reduced broadly with a
small exception in the north part of the continent as we can observe in WPDOP maps (b) and (f) along
column 2 of Figure 6.ii (area marked with an ellipse in red color). This happens due to scintillation
and not due to poor geometry since the PDOP values of the PDOP map (c) and (g) in column 3 of
Figure 6.ii. appear to be small in that region. In general, we can see along columns 4 of Figure 6.i
and 6.ii that the percentage contributions from scintillation, maps (d) and (h), are broadly similar
which implies that, while increasing the number of constellations (as currently shown) decreases the
WPDOP values, the effect of scintillation is not totally eliminated.
Furthermore, test case of Figure 7 demonstrates that the effect of scintillation activity can yield
different ground structures. This is happening because the geometry of the available constellations
and the risk maps are different between Figure 6 and Figure 7. The maps (d) and (h) along column 4
in Figure 7 reveal “shadowing effects” on the Earth due to scintillation around the ionospheric active
region, with the contribution decreasing with increasing distance from the scintillation structures.
Similarly as in the example of Figure 7 we can conclude that the effect of scintillation on the ground
is reduced when more satellites are in use and when the high risk regions in the ionospheric map are
more localized.
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(i) Ionospheric risk map estimated using S4 data over 23.00-03.00 (UT)
and ground maps using only GPS constellation at 01.00.09 (UT)
(ii) Ionospheric risk map using S4 data over 23.00-03.00 (UT)
and ground maps using GPS, GLONASS and Galileo constellation at 01.00.09 (UT)
Figure 6: Risk maps and ground maps for different sets of satellite constellations for 02 November 2014. Ionospheric
static risk maps were estimated using data over the interval 23.00-03.00 (UT). The geometry of the constellations for
the ground maps was that of time instant 01.00.09 (UT). Within (i) or (ii) each row corresponds to different thresholds
in S4. From left to right, column 1 shows ionospheric risk maps for thresholds in S4 of 0.3 and 0.5, and scintillation
duration of 5 minutes, column 2 illustrates WPDOP ground maps which explicitly incorporate the scintillation risks as
weights from ionospheric map in column 1, column 3 gives the PDOP ground maps (with no scintillation being included),
column 4 give us the difference between WPDOP and PDOP, expressed as a percentage of WPDOP. The regions that
are described in the text are marked with colored ellipses.
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(i) Ionospheric risk map estimated using S4 data over 23.00-03.00 (UT)
and ground maps using only GPS constellation at precisely 01.00.09 (UT)
(ii) Ionospheric risk map using S4 data over 23.00-03.00 (UT)
and ground maps using GPS, GLONASS and Galileo constellation at 01.00.09 (UT)
Figure 7: The results are presented as in Figure 6. Ionospheric risk maps and ground maps for different sets of satellite
constellations for 03 November 2014.
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4.6. Discussion
4.6.1. Current implementation and intrinsic limitations
In the current application of our methodology, we were restricted by the number of available
ground scintillation monitors (unfortunately, at the moment the ground monitors are very few and
unevenly spread over the continent) and the fixed number of satellites. So, in effect these limitations
forced us to produce ionospheric scintillation risk maps using data collected over a relatively long time
window. The selection of the 4 hour time window (period of the highest scintillation activity) was
used to capture the average scintillation activity. Therefore, the estimated static risk maps described
the average scintillation activity during the specific time window.
A WPDOP value was estimated for a specific locations using the number of available satellites at
that moment and the risk map, as shown in Figure 3.b. The weights were assigned to different ray-paths
based on the ionospheric scintillation risk maps and were directly related to statistical information
about scintillation since the risks that were used to estimate the weights (eq. 26) had been computed
from scintillation data (i.e. scintillation intensity and duration which has been extracted from S4
measurements). Therefore, the proposed WPDOP included the impact of the average scintillation
activity.
In the future, if more scintillation monitors are built on the ground then our methodology can
produce ionospheric scintillation maps with higher temporal resolution (say, every 30 or 15 minutes).
This will allow to update the weights in the WPDOP constantly and to observe the impact of the
dynamic scintillation activity. Currently, we can say that a moving window and/or a shorter time
window for the data collection (to construct ionospheric risk maps) could be implemented only in
areas that are covered by a dense network of scintillation monitors. By using shorter data collection
intervals and considering for example lower scintillation thresholds, we could produce scintillation risk
maps useful in aircraft navigation. These risk maps can update the weights in the PDOP and provide
information to the pilot whether to trust the navigation system.
4.6.2. Comparing WPDOP with PDOP
The dilution of precision is used as a quality measure in positioning systems since it expresses
the expected uncertainty in the positioning estimates. Roughly speaking, a low dilution of precision
implies high confidence level in the positioning results, and a high dilution of precision indicates low
confidence level.
In general, we can notice that the standard PDOP considers implicitly the scintillation effects in
the sense that strong scintillation can lead to loss of one or more satellites resulting in high measured
PDOP values (due to poor satellite geometry of the remaining satellites). However, by using the
standard PDOP it is not possible to quantify the impact that low-to-high scintillation activity has on
the accuracy of a positioning system when losses of lock do not occur. In such cases, the degradation of
the GNSS positioning may be significant even though the satellite constellation geometry would appear
promising. The concept of WPDOP allows to estimate the impact that scintillation induced errors
can have on PDOP by assigning the proposed scintillation weights in all the available satellite-receiver
links.
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Overall, we observed that the more satellites were used in the estimation of the dilution of precision,
the lower were the values both for PDOP and WPDOP and hence lower position errors were expected5.
So, the combination of GPS, GLONASS and Galileo can improve precision. However, there were still
some areas which were affected by scintillation (especially for weak scintillation of duration 5 minutes
or more) even when all the available constellations were used. This suggests that by increasing the
number of satellites in view, the positioning precision can be further improved in the case of strong
localized scintillation. This outcome is in line with a recent work by [34] and the review article [26].
4.6.3. Novelty and transferability
In this work, instead of using basic statistical analysis, we exploited the concept of risk from
decision theory to quantify the effects that the ionospheric scintillation can have on potential end-
user activities. In particular, we derived risks considering that the quality of a satellite-receiver
communication can be characterized only by scintillation measurements and then we constructed
ionospheric risk maps using S4 data provided by the UNESP server in South America. As we showed
in section 4.4 this methodology can be used for the construction of sequences of ionospheric risk
maps (Figure. 4and 5). Such maps could be further used as a-priori information for ionospheric
stochastic models, for enriching scintillation climatology data-bases, or for improving understanding of
scintillation phenomena over multiple years [42, 22]. Moreover, by explicitly incorporating scintillation
risks into dilution of precision, one can overcome intrinsic limitations of empirical models and receiver
specifications. Finally, the proposed methodology allows to produce high resolution ground map which
could potentially be used to help mitigate the effects of ionospheric scintillation on GNSS positioning.
The proposed methodology for the construction of ionospheric risk and ground maps is reusable
and transferable. Notably, if one wants to tailor risk to specific applications, then this methodology
has the advantage that its parameters can be optimized and validated for specific applications. For
example the loss function (eq. 4) allows us to select scintillation intensity and duration thresholds,
xth and dth respectively, based on the specifications of the receiver and the needs of safety critical
applications. By employing a 0-1 loss function, we showed that risks can be easily interpreted in
terms of probability of scintillation events. However, not only the thresholds, but also alternative loss
functions to equation (eq. 4) can be adopted. Moreover, our risk formalism allows to consider extra
(measurable) inputs in feature Z (of section 2.1) in addition to scintillation data X and durations of
events D, such as information about data gaps and other ionospheric quantities (e.g. total electron
content (TEC)). Therefore, the risks (eq.5) (as joint probabilities of multiple parameters) can be
estimated to illustrate an overall ionospheric activity. Regarding the weighting factors ws (eq. 16),
different shapes of the error variance function h(.) (eq. 11) can be adopted based on the outcomes of
future research without any changes in the proposed methodology of section 2.3.
Alternatively, the construction of multiple risk maps using different sets of inputs (measurable
features), such as scintillation values measured in different frequencies which reflect how small-scale
plasma density irregularities in F region affect different propagating signals and gradients of the TEC
which can capture large scale irregularities, can offer versatile and complimentary information to
5For further details about the link between WPDO/PDOP and position error see Appendix Appendix C
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the users. As a further step, these sets of risk maps can infer implicit statistical information about
different (multi-frequency) errors which can be considered in the position error model (eq. 6) and the
estimation of the weights in the WPDOP. Hence, the concept of WPDOP can be extended to include
other ionospheric-related errors to inform how different propagation errors arising from ionospheric
structures can impact the positioning on the ground.
In particular, our formalism enables the adaptation of the WPDOP given the presence of scintil-
lation or any other ionospheric-related errors (e.g. in the equatorial F-region). For example the error
term in the observation model (eq. 6) could be decomposed into more uncorrelated error terms e.g.
ε = εsc + ε∆TEC + εrem and the corresponding ionospheric risks could be used to provide information
about the different error variances (expressed as weights) for the WPDOP, e.g.
ws =
γ
γε(s)
=
γ
γ + h(r
(s)
sc ) + g(r
(s)
∆TEC)
for s = 1 . . . S,
where g(r
(s)
∆TEC) is the error covariance due to ∆TEC ionospheric effects. Therefore, based on the
available statistical knowledge, a WPDOP calculated by any hypothetical receiver could depend upon
the combination of scintillation levels on multiple frequencies (utilized for positioning), the presence
of losses of lock on some or all the frequencies associated with a given link, other ionospheric errors
(e.g. TEC) and the geometry of the available links. Then by comparing WPDOP against PDOP,
we can infer information about the impact that different ionospheric irregularities can have on the
positioning accuracy on the ground.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposed a methodology which connects the ionospheric uncertainties in the sky orig-
inating from small-scale irregularities in the F-region (e.g. in the equatorial ionosphere) with their
impact on the positioning on the ground. In particular, first we exploited decision theory to develop
risks defined as expected losses that incur during a satellite communication activity which is assumed
to be fully characterized by ionospheric measurable features, in our case scintillation intensity and
duration. The proposed scintillation risks relied on a 0-1 loss function and thus they were equal to the
joint probability of scintillation intensity and duration above specified thresholds. The derived risk
formulation was used to estimate pixel-wise risk values in an uniform ionospheric grid at 350 km and
the estimated risk maps reflected the ionospheric plasma density inhomogeneities causing scintillation
during the observed time window.
We demonstrated our methodology by estimating risk maps in the sky using accumulated data
obtained from GPS, GLONASS and Galileo scintillation monitors in South America during local night-
time hours and using different scintillation intensity and duration thresholds. Overall, we observed
that the two bands of scintillation i.e. north and south of the geomagnetic equator were visible in
cases where the intensity threshold did not exceed value 0.5 and when the duration of the scintillation
events was up to 10 minutes. Subsequently, to understand the effect of scintillation on the ground, we
proposed to use a weighted position dilution of precision (WPDOP) which was estimated by assigning
different weights to receiver measurements from different satellites using the ionospheric scintillation
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risks along the line-of-sights (LoSs) of the corresponding links. Thus, the dilution of precision on the
ground depended upon the combination of the geometry of the available links and the scintillation-
induced observable errors (quantified though the scintillation risks) on the same available links.
Finally, we constructed instantaneous WPDOP ground maps combining information from the
ionospheric risk maps and the available link geometries. The WPDOP maps revealed those areas
on the ground which were more affected by ionospheric scintillation. We noted that the scintillation
effects on the ground receiver were more prominent when only GPS was available. However, the effects
were not totally eliminated with the addition of extra constellations.
The present work focused on the effect of ionospheric scintillation to the dilution of precision. In
the future, other sources of errors or modelling uncertainties can be taken into account in the dilution
of precision estimations (i.e. superposition of risks associated, not only with scintillation but also
with other ionospheric measurable features, can be considered). Also, we expect to further study how
errors due to scintillation limit the accuracy in position estimation both from theoretical and applied
perspective and how statistical information about these errors can be incorporated into existing precise
point positioning softwares.
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Appendix A. Pseudorange measurements for position recovery
The pseudorange observation model(at frequency (fi) in the Li band can be written as [27, 34],
P (s)(r) = ‖r− r(s)‖2 + ν, (A.1)
where P s(r) is the measured pseudorange, ‖r−r(s)‖2 =
√
(rx − r(s)x )2 + (ry − r(s)y )2 + (rz − r(s)z )2 is the
geometric range between the receiver’s antenna at location r = (rx, ry, rz) and the satellite’s antenna
at location r(s) = (r
(s)
x , r
(s)
y , r
(s)
z ) respectively. Term ν represents the model errors and any unmodelled
effects including the clock errors. We note that in the current analysis, we omit the clock uncertainty
effect and thus to retrieve receiver’s position, r, we need to have a set of at least three equations of
the form (eq. A.1); in other words, at least 3 satellites have to be available.
Since the observation model (eq. A.1) is non-linear, a first order Taylor approximation is used, i.e.
P (s)(r) = P (s)(r0) +
(
∇P (s)(r0)
)T
∆r + ε(s), (A.2)
where P (s)(r0) is an approximate (computed) estimate, ∇P (s)(r0) = [∂P (s)∂rx , ∂P
(s)
∂ry
, ∂P
(s)
∂rz
]T, ∆r =
[∆rx,∆ry,∆rz]
T is the position error and ε(s) includes all the errors related to the numerical approxi-
mations and the model uncertainties. Furthermore, based on (eq. A.1),∇P (s)(r0) = [ rx0−r
(s)
x
‖r0−r(s)‖2 ,
ry0−r
(s)
y
‖r0−r(s)‖2 ,
rz0−r
(s)
z
‖r0−r(s)‖2 ]
T.
Then, we end up with a set of linear equations
b = A∆r + ε, (A.3)
where b = [P (1)(r) − P (1)(r0), . . . , P (S)(r) − P (S)(r0)]T ∈ RS , A = [∇P (1)(r0) . . .∇P (S)(r0)]T ∈ RS×3
and ε ∈ RS . Here, we assume that even in the absence of a loss of lock, scintillation can induce
higher-order errors in the observables that do not cancel out in dual frequency combinations [5, 54].
Appendix B. Defining the position dilution of precision
As we will show in the following text, the position dilution of precision is a measure of the uncer-
tainty of the estimates ∆̂r and it is parameterized according to the statistical characterization of the
errors ε and the linear model used for the position estimates (eq. 6). In particular, by denoting Γxx,
Γyy and Γzz the diagonal elements of the general covariance Γ = (A
TΓ−1ε A)−1 (eq. 14), the standard
deviations of ∆̂r (eq. 13) in X,Y and Z direction are σx =
√
Γxx, σy =
√
Γyy and σz =
√
Γzz respec-
tively. The dilution of precision is defined as the normalized (with a common scaling factor κ) root
mean square (RMS) of the standard deviations given by
RMS =
√
σ2x + σ
2
y + σ
2
z =
√
Γxx + Γyy + Γzz =
√
tr(Γ) =
√
tr((ATΓ−1ε A)−1). (B.1)
So, the general form of the position dilution of precision is
PDOPXY Z =
RMS√
κ
=
√
tr((ATΓ−1ε A)−1)√
k
=
√
tr((ATWA)−1) (B.2)
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where W =
(
Γε
κ
)−1
. Based on that ratio, we can see that the weights can be derived based on the
prior knowledge about the error statistics. Furthermore, from the expression of the PDOPXY Z we
can understand that the dilution of precision is not the actual positioning error, but a measure of the
uncertainty of the estimates ∆̂r. Therefore, the key feature of the dilution of precision is that it is a
single value that can be used as an indicator about the reliability of a positioning system. Moreover,
we can notice that as matrix A and W do not depend on the measurements, but only on the geometry
and the weighting scheme, dilution of precision can be computed from the satellite orbital information
without needing real measurements. Currently, there are empirical tables that relate PDOP values
with the expected accuracy of a positioning system (see for example table 1 in [56]).
In the following text, we will see that the scaling factor κ is defined based on the model of
the observation error. More precisely, for observation errors modeled as in section 2.3.1, the error
covariance is given by Γε = γI
S×S and
RMS =
√
γtr((ATA)−1). (B.3)
Therefore, the common scaling factor is κ = γ and W = IS×S . Then, we have the well-known standard
position dilution of precision given by (eq. 9).
For an observation error modelled as in (eq. 10 of section 2.3.2), the error covariance has two terms,
i.e.
Γε = γI
S×S + Γεsc . (B.4)
Using the matrix inversion lemma, we have that Γ−1ε = γ−1(IS×S − (γΓ−1εsc + IS×S)−1). Inserting the
previous expression in the RMS, we have that
RMS =
√
γtr((ATUA)−1), (B.5)
where U = IS×S − (γΓ−1εsc + IS×S)−1 and Γ−1ε = γ−1U . Therefore, the scaling factor κ = γ and
now W = U . Given the scintillation error covariance Γεsc = diag(h(r
(s)
ion)) we can easily show that
W = diag
(
γ
γ+h(r
(s)
ion)
)
as in (eq. 16). Thefore, based on the previous error analysis, PDOP is given by
PDOPXY Z =
√
σ2x + σ
2
y + σ
2
z
√
γ
=
√
tr((ATΓ−1ε A)−1)√
γ
. (B.6)
Appendix C. Average position error and position dilution of precision
Let us first clarify that ∆r = rtr − r0 is the position difference between the true XYZ position
vector, rtr = (rxtr , rytr , rztr), and the computed (approximate) one, r0 = (rx0 , ry0 , rz0), and ∆̂r = rˆ− r0
is the position vector difference between the estimated position vector rˆ = (rˆx, rˆy, rˆz) and r0.
Based on the linear system (eq. 6) and the observation error modelled using a Gaussian distribution
i.e. ε ∼ N (0,Γε), the estimated position is given by
rˆ = r0 + (A
TΓ−1ε A)
−1ATΓ−1ε b. (C.1)
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The statistical expectation, denoted by E[·] and covariance, denoted by Cov[·], of rˆ are
E[ˆr] =r0 + (ATΓ−1ε A)−1ATΓ−1ε E[b] = rtr (C.2)
Cov[ˆr] =(ATΓ−1ε A)
−1ATΓ−1ε Cov[b]Γ
−1
ε A(A
TΓ−1ε A)
−1 = (ATΓ−1ε A)
−1 = Γ, (C.3)
where E[b] = E[A(rtr − r0) + ε], E[ε] = 0 and Cov[b] = Γε.
The position error vector between the true and the estimation position vector is defined as e =
(ex, ey, ez) = rˆ− rtr.
The statistical expectation and covariance of the position error are respectively
E[e] =E[ˆr]− rtr = 0 (C.4)
Cov[e] =Cov[ˆr] = Γ. (C.5)
The average square magnitude of the position error, given by ‖e‖2 = e2x + e2y + e2z = (rˆx − rxtr)2 +
(rˆy − rytr)2 + (rˆz − rztr)2, is
E[‖e‖2] = E[e2x] + E[e2y] + E[e2z] = tr(Cov[e]) = tr(Γ) = tr((ATΓ−1ε A)−1) (C.6)
From (eq. B.6) we get that
E[‖e‖2] = γPDOP2XY Z (C.7)
where γ is a scaling factor. Finally,
PDOPXY Z ∝
√
E[‖e‖2]. (C.8)
Therefore, we can see that the position dilution of precision is proportional to the root of the expected
square magnitude of the position error 6. We emphasize that the estimation of position error statistics
would require real measurements taken for a fixed matrix A (i.e. for a fixed satellite constellation)
over a very long period of time. This kind of requirement is in most cases far from feasible (obviously
because the available satellite constellations change over time) which makes the model-based PDOP
so crucial in quantifying the expected position errors in positioning and navigation systems. .
.
6In reality, the true covariance of the observation errors, denoted by Γtrueε is only partly known. Of course, the better
we can approximate the true covariance Γtrueε , the better we can predict the expected error between the true and the
estimated position by using the PDOP. If the approximation Γε ≈ Γtrueε , we end up with the well-known result (eq. C.8).
However, if Γε 6≈ Γtrueε , then (eq. C.8) is not valid anymore. For example, during high scintillation activity we aim to
improve the approximation Γε ≈ Γtrueε by introducing statistical knowledge concerning scintillation into Γε, and thus
estimate a weighted PDOP that satisfies (eq. C.8).
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